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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
A recent Kentucky case held that a city's duty to keep sidewalks
reasonably safe extended to every part thereof. Louisville Railway Co.
v. Jackey, 237 Ky. 125, 35 S. W. (2nd) 28.
The problems of negligence, notice, reasonably safe conditions, and
proximate cause are questions of fact arising in every case. After a
study of the cases involving the above problems it will be seen that the
principal case of .Paducah v. Konle, supra, is in accord with the
general as well as the Kentucky rule; namely, that a city must
exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of its streets or be liable for
injuries occasioned by defects of which the city has notice.
JAMES WTILLIA HUMP.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY. Since the doctrine of the right of
privacy was discussed pro and con in this Law Journal in the January,
1931, issue, three new cases have appeared to further complicate the
situation. Two of them were decided in states which have already
recognized the right of privacy, Kentucky and Georgia; but the third
case, Melvin v. Reid, Cal. App., 297 Pac. 91, apparently brings within
the select circle of those acknowledging the existence of such a right,
the hitherto virgin state of California.
This California case, Melvin v. Reid, not only brings within the
fold another state to give relief to those who allege that their rights of
privacy have been violated, but also adds California to the list of states
which in effect deny the right of privacy a common law standing.
The court says:
"In the absence of any provision of law, we would be loath
to conclude that the right of privacy as the foundation for an
action in tort, in the form known and recognized in bther
jurisdictions, exists in California." 297 Pac. 91 at 93..
By thus becoming authority for both proponents and opponents of, the
doctrine, the case loses most of its value for either side.
The seeming paradox in this case is explained away through the
conscription of that indefinable constitutional guarantee to every man
of the right to pursue happiness. This provision of the California
Constitution, Section I of Article I, provides as follows:
"All men are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
The capitalizing by the defendants of the unsavory incidents of the
plaintiff's past life through the medium of cinematography, coupled
WVith the use of her true maiden name, was held actionable as a direct
invasion of this inalienable right to pursue and obtain happiness.
Laudable as is the result reached by the court, and damnable as
the scurrilous practices of the defendant appear to be; it is believed
that the result does not so logically follow from the provision quoted
that other states having approximately the same, or similarly worded,
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constitutional guarantees would be justified in following the lead of
the California court. The interpretation of the Constitution of each
state Is for the highest court of that particular state; so Melvin v. Reid,
since it is based solely on constitutional grounds, is really of little
value in other jurisdictions.
The constitutional basis for the right of privacy has been raised in
a few prior cases. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, the
pioneer case recognizing the right of privacy, the right of recovery was
based in part on constitutional grounds. There, however, the "due
process" clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions were
the ones relied on. The court said:
"The right of privacy within certain limits is a right
derived from natural law, recognized by the principles of
municipal law, and guaranteed to persons in this state both
by the Constitutions of the United States and of the state of
Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall
be deprived of liberty except by due process of law." 50 S. E.
68 at 71.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court in Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 60 L. Ed. 1044, 42 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 516, 27 A. L. R. 27; and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
in Henry v. Cherry, 73 Atl. 97, 30 R. I. 13, have repudiated this constitutional ground for recognizing the right of privacy. It should be
noted in passing that fhe California court, which is the first to base the
right of privacy solely on constitutional provisions, is not a court of
last resort.
The other two recent cases, Rhodes v. Graham, 233 Ky. 225,
37 S. W. (2) 46, and Bazemore et aL. v. Savannah Hospital et al.,
155 S. E. (Ga.) 194, were decided in states which had previously recognized the right of privacy; hence they are justifiable on precedent.
Whether or not the result reached could have been based on other
grounds of recovery therefore becomes a question of only secondary
importance.
The Kentucky case, Rhodes v. Graham, held that the tapping of
telephone wires leading to plaintiff's home, and the listening-in on
the plaintiff's conversations constituted an invasion of the plaintiff's
right of privacy for which redress at law would be granted. The
chief value in this case lies not in the enunciation of a new right, or in
the unearthing of a new basis for an already recognized right, but in
the application of an established right to a new set of facts. The result
is clearly desirable, even though the development of the right of privacy be admittedly a piece of judicial legislation.
The Georgia Case, Bazemore v. Hospital, slightly extends the doctrine of the right of privacy In that it gives a right of recovery to
parents against the parties who, without authority, published photographs of the malformation of the plaintiff's deceased infant child. In
a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Hill pointed out that heretofore
the right of privacy had been considered a purely-personal right; and
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that in this case the plaintiff's right to an "inviolate personality" had
in no sense been infringed. This dissent was concurred in by Presiding
Justice Beck. While the result may not find even law review statements to support it, it is less a departure from established principles
of tort law in Georgia than was the original right of privacy case
decided by the Georgia Court, PavesielL v. New Bngand Life Ins. Co.
The acts of the defandants outrage the sense of decency of the court,
and the right of privacy is invoked to give relief.
From a purely ethical standpoint, probably no civilized man would
disagree with the results reached in many of the cases giving relief
for right of privacy violations; but good morals do not always make
good law. Casuistry is a poor substitute for stare decisis.
RuFus LIsLE.

